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«… I dismissed the head of the SBU and [I] dismissed the head of the State Security of Ukraine», said
Leonid Kuchma in an interview to the Radio Liberty (Ukraina Moloda, February 14, 2001).
The head of the state argued his decision had been motivated by the security of Ukraine and the
President, and stressed that «never and on no condition [he] would allow force to be used for resolving
political conflicts» (1+1, TSN, February 12, 2001). He also added that the current complication of the
political situation would make everybody see which of the political forces supported the country's
European choice and which only act to block that process.
The official formulation of reasons for the dismissal of Leonid Derkach from the position of head of
the SBU aimed at showing that it was not a concession to members of the Ukrainian parliament who
voted on December 15, 2000 to urge Kuchma to fire the «force ministers», the SBU head included.
Commenting on the dismissal of Derkach, on February 12, 2001, First Vice Speaker of the Rada Victor
Medvedchuk announced that the step had been caused by a number of factors, «including what had
been discussed in the Verkhovna Rada,» but showed that he was not inclined to link the dismissal to
the Rada's resolution only (Interfax-Ukraina, February 12, 2001). «I think the head of the state had a
number of complaints to the SBU, quite objective ones,» he said.
Meanwhile, Leonid Kuchma announced he had «approved the first decision, but it will not be the last
one… there must be new names in the team, new persons - there is no doubt about that … I have
always been pleased to open the embrace for those who want to work not for the President, but, first of
all, for the country…» (Ukraina Moloda, February 14, 2001).
Hence, developments of the political crisis and actions of top-ranking decision-makers suggest that
more staff reshuffles are likely to occur in the Ukrainian political establishment.
After the session of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on February 10, 2001, that,
according to its Secretary Yevhen Marchuk, gathered to respond to «threats to the constitutional order
of Ukraine», and assess the «adequacy of measures taken by the bodies of power to neutralize those
threats», Yevhen Marchuk voiced a similar opinion about the likely changes. «This is important, but
not crucial,» he noted, commenting on the recent dismissals (Interfax-Ukraina, February 12, 2001). In
his words, «crucial» was the need to «develop a complex of measures of political nature» aiming at
settling the situation. To date nothing has been said to indicate what exactly he had in mind.
The official reason for the dismissal of Derkach publicly discharged the claim that the action
symbolized the readiness of the state authorities to start negotiations with the opposition. While the
strong demand for the dismissal of the Ukrainian «force ministers» in general and Derkach in particular
was one of the key slogans of the «Ukraine without Kuchma» action, the opposition's public reaction to
the dismissal of the SBU head showed that the political crisis continued to deteriorate and that neither
of the conflicting parties regarded it as a necessary and desirable compromise.
Commenting on Derkach's dismissal, one of the leaders of the «Ukraine without Kuchma», chairman of
the Socialist Party of Ukraine Oleksandr Moroz emphasized again that all law-enforcement ministers,
and Attorney General of Ukraine Mykhailo Potebenko had to go, while arguing that «the dismissal of
all force ministers and the Attorney General could only be a preliminary condition for the opposition to
continue negotiations with the Presidential Administration (Interfax-Ukraina, February 10, 2001).
Hence, the opposition does not view the dismissal of Derkach as a step towards starting a political
dialogue and reaching a possible compromise.
On February 13 the political «barricades» between the power establishment and the opposition grew
even higher after the arrest of one of the opposition leaders, a driving force behind the «Public
Initiative of the National Salvation Forum», recently fired former Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine and
leader of the Batkivshchyna party Yulia Tymoshenko. The situation became even more dramatic when
on the same day the state's top-ranking officials, President Kuchma, Speaker Ivan Pliushch and Prime
Minister Victor Yushchenko issued an «appeal to the Ukrainian people, practically announcing an
offensive against the opposition. «Things should be called what they are: an unprecedented political
campaign bearing all features of a psychological war has been unleashed against our state,» the
statement read. The document contained some unequivocal comments about the «announced National
Salvation Forum». According to the three top leaders of the state, «leaders of this motley conglomerate,
insulted by their own political failures and downfalls, truly seek salvation. Yet, not for the state, not for
the nation, but for themselves - [they seek salvation] from political bankruptcy and oblivion. And some
[of them] - also from criminal liability.»
Hence, the recent events suggest there is no reason to think that the state establishment is prepared to
make positive gestures to the opposition. Similarly, it is unlikely that Minister of the Interior Yuri
Kravchenko, head of the Customs Service Yuri Solovkov and head of the State Taxation
Administration Mykola Azarov will also be dismissed, as the opposition demands. Indirectly, this point
was supported by Victor Medvedchuk who said he knew nothing about «possible further resignations»
(Interfax-Ukraina, February 12, 2001). In his view, «nowadays there is no reason for the resignation of
the Minister of the Interior» and the likely resignation of the Attorney General could be linked
primarily with his official report to the parliament, expected to take place later in February.
In the midst of the political crisis, the appointment of Volodymyr Radchenko to the position of the
head of the SBU, immediately after the dismissal of Derkach, was practically unnoticed. «Leonid
Kuchma described Radchenko as «a professional man, a graduate of a good school». Interestingly, the
new head of the SBU received rather positive comments of the opposition. According to Oleksandr
Moroz, Radchenko is «a professional who has not left the trace like the one the current head did… he
did not engage in political provocation and, besides, he does not have any compromising relations with
the financial-criminal world» (Interfax-Ukraina, February 10, 2001)
No doubt, Volodymyr Radchenko has significant professional experience. He graduated from the
higher KGB school in 1972, and was head of the Department of Fighting Corruption and Organized
Crime and Deputy Head of the SBU from March 1994 till July 1994, when the SBU was led by
Yevhen Marchuk.
On July 28, 1994, Volodymyr Radchenko became Minister of the Interior of Ukraine. He resigned
about a year later in order to become head of the SBU on July 3, 1995. He joined the National Security
and Defense Council in 1996 and remained the head of the SBU till April 1998, when he was
succeeded by Leonid Derkach. On April 22, 1998, Radchenko was appointed to the position of First
Deputy Secretary of the NSDC. His professional record includes the position of chairman of the
Commission for Exports Control and Military-Technical Cooperation between Ukraine and foreign
states.
Head of the SBU Volodymyr Radchenko was remembered by principle public declarations of the
SBU's non-involvement in political processes. He dismissed any «speculations» in the media that
accused the SBU of collecting compromising materials and exerting pressure on political opponents. «I
have always been opposed to that and I will never give up. The time of political intelligence is over,»
he said (Zerkalo Nedeli, February 1, 1997). However, his comments do not allow any conclusions as to
whether his agency received proposals to engage in that kind of activity. «The President is a person I
respect, [he] understands that we shall not do such things» (Zerkalo Nedeli, February 1, 1997). «the
President is aware of the Service's view that political intelligence and, moreover, collecting
compromising materials about political competitors, should not be allowed. And he supports us in that»
(Zerkalo Nedeli, November 15, 1997).
«The Service's key task is to provide information and analysis to top power bodies, primarily the
President,» - Radchenko argued, «The issues in question are related to real national security threats.
Lately, we focus our reports to the President on economic problems, aspects that hinder reforms and
economic transformation. We identify causes of slowing down the reforms in Ukraine» (Zerkalo
Nedeli, November 15, 1997).
Nowadays, only about one year before the next scheduled parliamentary elections, it is worth
remembering the position taken by Volodymyr Radchenko and the SBU under his leadership durin
the 1998 parliamentary election campaign.
Commenting on election campaigns and questions about the SBU's potential involvement, Radchenko
referred to «moral responsibility»: «if the question is about the state security and important information
of any nature, then, obviously, the Service can find money for such things. But if it has to do with
domestic processes, pre-election struggle, collecting compromising materials, then, in our view, this is
just a waste of time. It is immoral. I should say that my colleagues (especially those who have 20 or 25
years of [secret] service experience have seen everything in their lives, and we have no desire
whatsoever to slip to the way that leads nowhere. [We] don't want to look at ourselves in the mirror and
turn away, disgusted (Zerkalo Nedeli, November 15, 1997). Again, it is unclear if these views have
undergone any transformation within the recent 3+ years.
Then, head of the SBU Radchenko explained basics of his service's political neutrality established by
the legal framework: «All SBU officers are de-politicized, none is a member of any political party. And
<…> should any SBU officer be found helping any political party or group he would leave our ranks
immediately. Every our officer had to sign up to these rules» (Zerkalo Nedeli, November 15, 1997).
Meanwhile, his SBU was prepared to respond to possible dramatic changes in the political
environment: «We are not dealing with parties and associations, except the parties and associations
whose actions or agendas infringe on the current legislation, calling for the liquidation of the current
constitutional order, making territorial claims, etc. Investigation of party financing is also beyond our
competence, but if there is an order to study that issue, approved by the parliament, from the top-
ranking law-making authorities, then we will perform that order. I think such investigation would result
in a lot of money that could be used for paying pensions, wages and provision of social guarantees. But
I do not think that such a decision will ever be approved by the parliament…» (Zerkalo Nedeli,
November 15, 1997).
Judging from his statements, at that time the SBU leadership was determined not to take part in
political processes, seeing such engagement as «waste of forces and resources» and immoral behavior
that could have led the security services to «nowhere» (Holos Ukrainy - Tyzhden, May 1-14, 1998).
However, the point is that democratization of the SBU was declared - and possibly pursued - personally
by then head of the SBU.
In 1998, before a lengthy presidential election campaign, Radchenko's name was linked to Leonid
Kuchma's potential competitor, also former head of the SBU, Yevhen Marchuk. On April 22, 1998,
Radchenko was replaced by former head of the Customs Committee of Ukraine Leonid Derkach.
Under the new leadership the whole Service was swept with staff reshuffles. By the end of May 1998
Leonid Derkach replaced 18 heads of regional departments of the SBU in a move that was seen by
observers as an effort to get rid of Marchuk's supporters and plant his own loyal officers.
The current situation differs dramatically from mid-1998. NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk who had
«inherited» the position from Volodymyr Horbulin between the first round of the presidential election
(October 31, 1999) and the run-off two weeks later, by means of convincing most of his supporters to
vote for Leonid Kuchma, nowadays is on President Kuchma's side. The new appointment may be
regarded as a sign of increasing role and influence of the NSDC Secretary. On the other hand, Leonid
Derkach's dismissal is likely to undermine capacity and hinder business opportunities for some related
financial-industrial groups.
Meanwhile, some Ukrainian media tend to view the new appointment as a warning of additional
pressure against the Ukrainian opposition. For instance, the Den daily, commenting on the appointment
in the context of activities and the role of the opposition, warned that Volodymyr Radchenko could
caused a number of problems to founders of the National Salvation Forum: «the new head of the SBU
has a lot to ask a number of the Forum's political activists, and he will probably have more questions to
them than the new formation's leaders will have to Volodymyr Radchenko» (Den, February 13, 2001).
«In the leading segment of the SBU, nowadays there is no person that would be better informed about
mechanisms of establishment and operation of opposition political formations [then Radchenko}, the
article went on.
Either of the different predictions - from non-involvement in political processes following the 1997
model, to «questions to many of the Forum's political activists» - only stresses the need for the control
of the civil society over law-enforcement activities. The point is not to allow extensive unqualified
interference in the performance of law-enforcement agencies, but to ensure that notwithstanding staff
reshuffles and personal preferences of individual law-enforcement leaders, the structures would not
transform into storage facilities for «kompromat» but could effectively serve their function of
providing for national security.
